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EU Climate Change Policy 2013-2020: Using the Clean 
Development Mechanism More Effectively 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Under the 2008-2012 EU climate change programme, a Member State can meet part 
of its non-ETS emission targets through purchasing emission offsets or credits from 
developing (or non-Annex 1) countries through the Clean Development Mechanism 
(“CDM”).  The credit or offset is generated by a certified CDM project that leads to a 
reduction in emissions in the developing country compared with a business as usual 
scenario.  The reduction results in the issuance of a Certified Emission Reduction 
(“CER”), one unit of which is equal to one metric tonne of CO2.  Any unused Member 
State CDM credit (i.e. CERs) allocation simply lapses.  It cannot be traded either 
within or between Member States.  
 
Under the EU proposals for CO2 emission reduction between 2013 and 2020 the 
situation with respect to the CDM credits and the non-ETS sector is to change.  A new 
property right is to be created: a Member State can transfer annually to another 
Member State the right to its unused allocation of CDM credits.  In other words, what 
is traded is the option to purchase a CDM credit, not the underlying asset itself.  These 
rights will be referred to as Clean Development Mechanism Warrants or CDMWs.  
They are similar to share warrants1 or share options.2  The purpose of the creation of 
the new property right is to reduce the costs of meeting the EU emissions targets.   
 
CDMWs have been assigned, in the first instance, to the Member States.  These rights 
are likely to command a positive price.  CDM credits of up to 3% of the verified 2005 
non-ETS emissions of a Member State can be used annually over 2013-2020 to meet 
the Member State’s non-ETS emission limit or target.3  Two important issues 
surrounding CDMW are, as yet, unresolved.   
 
1 A warrant is defined as: “A written certificate that gives the holder the right to purchase shares of a stock for a specified price 
within a specified period of time date.”  (Source: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/stock+warrant, accessed 30 March 2009).   
2 A share option is defined as: “A privilege, sold by one party to another, that gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to 
buy (call) or sell (put) a stock at an agreed-upon price within a certain period or on a specific date.”  (Source: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stockoption.asp  Accessed 30 March 2009). 
3 A further 1% can be transferred annually to another entity within the same Member State such as firm that develops CDMs.  
However, it is difficult to see where the demand for this developing since the Member State is also the one that uses the CDM 
credits.  Therefore the paper does not deal with this aspect of CDMs and EU climate change policy. It also envisaged that for 
twelve Member States, including Ireland, an additional 1% of can come from CDM projects in the least developed and small 
island developing states.  However, these CDM credits are non-transferable and hence are not considered in this paper. For 
details see the CEC (2008c) and the EU Parliament‘s proposal on these issues, discussed in section 5 below.  
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• First, how should the Member State treat the CDMW in making decisions 
concerning emission reduction in the non-ETS sector?   
 
• Second, what mechanism should be used to facilitate the exchange of 
CDMWs? 
 
• Third, who should realise the value of CDMWs – the State, existing polluters 
etc?   
 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate on resolving these two issues.  
 
Sections 2 through 5 set the background.  Attention is focussed on 2008-2012, 
immediately preceding the introduction of CDMWs.  These years coincide with the 
first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol (“KP”) during which EU and other 
industrialised countries – referred to as Annex 1 countries – must meet their targets to 
restrict greenhouse gases.  Although the EU has set out emission reduction targets for 
the period 2013-2020, discussions on the successor to the KP are due to commence in 
Copenhagen in December 2009.  Depending on what emerges from Copenhagen, the 
analysis and conclusions in the paper may need to be modified and revised. 
 
Section 2 discusses briefly the current EU regime for CO2 emission control, paying 
particular attention to the non-ETS sector, while Section 3 defines and discusses the 
role of CDMs.  Section 4 discusses the interaction between, on the one hand, the ETS 
and non-ETS sectors and, on the other hand, CDMs. 
 
Section 5 presents the rationale and key features of the CDMWs, while section 6 sets 
out two general principles that should guide policy in addressing the two questions 
posed above.  Section 7 evaluates three alternative treatments of CDMWs and also 
considers the issue of the appropriate mechanism for exchanging CDMWs.  The final 
section of the paper returns to the three questions posed above.  
2. EU CO2 Emission Targets & Regulation: 2008-2012 
 
The EU sets a limit or maximum level of CO2 emissions,4 referred to as allowances, 
for each Member State.  One EU Allowance Unit (“EUA”) is equivalent to one tonne 
of CO2.  The level of allowances is set to restrict emissions below what they otherwise 
would be.  For the EU as a whole the target is to reduce emissions by 8% over the 
 
4 Non-CO2 emissions are converted into CO2 emissions. 
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period 2008-2012 compared to the 1990 level. In the case of Ireland its allowances are 
set at 13% above the 1990 level of CO2 emissions; in 2005 Ireland’s actual CO2 
emissions were 25% above the 1990 level (EPA, 2008, p. 6).  In other words, the 
target level of emissions is a binding constraint for most participants.  Despite the 
recession it appears that the target is still binding.5 
 
Each Member State has to design a National Action Plan (“NAP”), which 
demonstrates how it intends to conform to EU Emissions Trading Directive (Directive 
2003/87/EC).6  The current NAP covers 2008-2012.  The NAP: divides the overall 
allowance of a Member State into the EU ETS sector and the non-ETS sector; and, 
within the EU ETS sector, how the allowances will be distributed.  The NAP also 
considers emission reduction in the non-ETS sector. In Ireland the NAP is designed 
by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), within parameters set by 
government.7 
 
The EU ETS sector accounts for about a third of Ireland’s CO2 emissions as projected 
over the period 2008-2012 (EPA, 2006, p. 9).  Under the 2008-2012 NAP, the EU 
ETS and non-ETS allowances have to be complied with separately; there can be no 
transfers of allowances between the two sectors, either directly or indirectly.  The 
allowances are set for the five year period as a whole. 
 
EU ETS – the Traded Sector 
 
In Ireland’s NAP the EU ETS sector is divided into: general; cement; and power 
generation.8  Allowances are first made to these groups and then, within each group, 
to individual emission sources, referred to as installations.  In general these 
installations are large readily identified point emissions e.g. a brewery, an aluminium 
smelter, a power plant, a petroleum refinery or cement works.   
 
The Member State has little discretion in the mechanism selected to allocate the 
allowances to installations for the period 2008-2012.  The relevant EU Directive 
states that at least 90% of allowances should be distributed free of charge (EPA, 2008, 
 
5 See EPA (2009) for details. 
6 For details of Ireland’s NAP see EPA (2006, 2008). 
7 See EPA (2006, 2008) for details. 
8 Other Member States may also include, iron and steel, certain mineral industries and pulp and paper.  It appears that power 
generation is the most important source of CO2 emissions. In 2005 this sector accounted for 62% of all EU ETS allowances.  For 
details see Matthes & Neuhoff (2007, pp. 23-24). 
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p.3).  The allowances are assigned based on historic levels of emission of an 
installation (EPA, 2008, pp 14-15).  In other words, the more you polluted in the past, 
the bigger the allowance assigned today.  There is also an allowance reserve for new 
entrants into activities covered by the EU ETS. 
 
The remaining 10% of EU ETS allowances could be auctioned or grandfathered or 
allocated in some other transparent way by the member state.  Ireland chose to 
distribute 9.5% free to existing and new installations, with 0.5% sold to recover the 
cost of administering the emission scheme (EPA, 2008, p.5).9  Ireland retires unused 
allowances set aside for new entrants and, as such, these allowances contribute 
towards Ireland meeting its emission targets (EPA, 2008, p. 13).  Ireland has thus 
waived its right to auction EU ETS allowances.10  Germany (9%), the UK (7%), the 
Netherlands (3.7%), and Austria (1.3%) have chosen to auction at least part of their 
EU ETS allocation.11 Other Member States may follow.  
 
In Ireland allowances are issued annually by the EPA based on the 2003-2004 
emissions of an installation (EPA, 2008, p.5).  The installation receives the same 
annual allocation each year between 2008 and 2012.  Thus the installation is provided 
with certainty concerning the allowance that it will be assigned.12  Of course, if the 
installation ceases production then it is no longer assigned an allowance. 
 
The installation must, at the end of the year, hold allowances equal to its emissions 
that year.  The emissions can be greater than, equal to or less than the level of 
allowances that the EPA assigns the installation at the beginning of the year. 
 
The allowances assigned to an installation can be traded or exchanged by the 
installation’s owners – CRH plc, Diageo Ireland, the Electricity Supply Board, 
Conoco Philips Whitegate Refinery Limited and so on - within a Member State and 
across Member States.   
 
An active EU ETS market has developed in these allowances.  It grew between 2005 
and 2007 from 322 million tons of CO2 to 2,061 million tons of CO2 in 2007.13  These 
 
9 The 0.5% will be sold for the EPA by the NTMA. The first tranche of 185,000 EUAs were sold in December 2008. 
10 A change would require the approval of the Dail and the Commission.   
11 For details see: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/auctioning_en.htm 
12 These are notified to the Commission and published on its website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/initial_nap/ie.xls.  (Accessed on 30 March 2009). 
13 All data in this and the next paragraph is taken from Capoor & Ambrosi (2006, Table 2, p. 13; 2008, Table 2, p. 7). 
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volumes refer to spot, future and options trades.  Futures contracts account for the 
major part of the value and volume of transactions.   
 
The EU ETS market is by far the largest market for CO2 in the world, accounting for 
99% of CO2 traded by value in 2007   Although the current EU ETS trading period 
began on 1 January 2008, it nevertheless had the experience of the pilot phase of EU 
ETS trading between 2005-2007, during which an installation’s emissions were 
capped and trading allowed. 
 
Eighty per cent of transaction volumes according to Capoor & Ambrosi (2008, p. 8) 
were conducted in 2007 were over the counter (“OTC”)14 with the London Energy 
Brokers Association (“LEBA”) accounting for slightly over 50%.  The European 
Climate Exchange (“ECX”) accounted for more than 84% of exchange-traded 
transactions. There are at least five other exchanges,15 with prices posted on the 
internet.16     
 
The traders in the EU ETS market include installations, market intermediaries (e.g. 
trading houses, aggregators etc) and asset managers (e.g. investors carbon funds, 
hedge funds).  Capoor & Ambrosi (2008, p. 61) observe that banks entered the carbon 
market massively in 2007. 
 
The EU ETS trading system is underpinned by the Community Independent 
Transaction Log (“CITL”) that connects Member State registries and maintains an 
independent record of the issuance, transfer, cancellation, retirement and banking of 
allowances. 17  It has no role in relation to the financial aspects of a transaction and 
contains no information on prices.  The CITL has been in operation since 2005. 
 
 
14 In the OTC market, trading occurs via a network of middlemen, called dealers, who carry inventories of securities to facilitate 
the buy and sell orders of investors, rather than providing the order matchmaking service seen in specialist exchanges such as the 
NYSE.  Definition from:  http://www.answers.com/topic/over-the-counter-finance.  Accessed 19 February 2009. 
15European Climate Exchange (ECX) based in London and Amsterdam started in April 2005 
Nordic Power Exchange (Nord Pool) in Norway began in February 2005 
BlueNext in France started in June 2005 (Powernext Carbon became BlueNext on January 2008) 
European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Germany began in March 2005 
Energy Exchange Austria (EEA) in Austria began in June 2005 
SendeCO2 in Spain started at the end of 2005. 
16 See, for example,  
http://www.eex.com/en/Market%20Data/Trading%20Data/Emission%20Rights/Emission%20Futures%20%7C%20Derivatives/f
utures-table/2008-09-29#EUA 
17 For an animated presentation showing the interaction of the CITL and the Member State Registries with respect to several 
transactions see: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/citl_en.htm  
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It is mandatory for each Member State to have a national registry.  These registries 
will ensure the accurate accounting of all units under the Kyoto Protocol plus the 
accurate accounting of allowances under the EU scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading. Not only companies but also natural persons may open an account 
in any EU registry.  For example, environmentalists could purchase and retire permits 
so as to make targets stricter.  Registration of unregulated firms enables 
intermediaries and traders to participate in the EU ETS market. 
 
Ireland is a small player in the EU ETS market: it accounts for only 1% of all EU 
allowances under the EU ETS; and, around 100 of the 10,000 installations covered by 
the EU ETS scheme across the EU.  Thus Ireland, or more accurately installations 
located in the Republic of Ireland, is a price taker in this market.18  Furthermore this 
market, like any other, will be subject to the competition rules of the EU, as EU ETS 
exchanges effect trade between member states.  
 
Each installation has to make a decision concerning how much CO2 to emit annually, 
subject to the constraint that at the end of the year it has enough allowances to match 
its emissions.  In this respect it has a number of choices:  
 
• First, the installation may engage in abatement efforts so that the installation 
emits less CO2.  It will be profitable for the installation to do so until the 
marginal cost of reducing or abating a metric tonne of CO2 is equal to the 
price of an ETS allowance for one metric tonne (assuming that the marginal 
cost of trading is zero).   
 
• Second, the installation may purchase or sell allowances (i.e. EUAs) on the 
EU ETS market.  If its abatement efforts plus its assigned allowances are less 
than its volume of emissions it will have to buy EUAs.  On the other hand, if 
its abatement efforts plus its assigned allowances are greater than the volume 
of its emissions then it can sell the surplus EUAs.   
 
• Third, the installation could: (a) fund and develop a CDM project which 
would generate a CDM credit or CER; or (b) purchase a CDM credit in the 
secondary market, if its abatement efforts and assigned allowances fall short 
of its verified emissions.  CERs can be included in the allowances an 
installation surrenders, given its verified emissions.19 
 
18 The 1% is based on the experimental period 2005-2007.  There is no reason to think the share has changed for 2008-2012.  For 
details see Annex to: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/84&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage
=en 
19 It should be noted that the Joint Implementation (“JI”) can also be used.  However, to date it appears to be relatively little used 
in Ireland. For details see Section 4 below. 
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Thus if an installation requires additional allowances it can either purchase EUAs or 
develop/purchase CDM credits. 
 
It appears that installations in Ireland are overall net purchasers on the EU ETS 
market. In 2005 installations were allocated 19.237 million tonnes CO2, but actually 
emitted 22.398 m tCO2, a difference of 16% of the allowances awarded.  However, 
there was a substantial variation by installation.  For example, Scotchtown Cement 
Works had an allocation of 879,739 tCO2, but its emissions were 1,028,010 tCO2.20  
 
Non-ETS – the Non-Traded Sector 
 
The non-ETS sector is the rest of the economy not covered by the EU ETS 
arrangements.  Typically here CO2 emissions are from small scale sources such as 
transport (e.g. cars, trucks), buildings (e.g. heating), services, agriculture and waste. 
 
In order to meet its emission limits in the non-ETS sector, Ireland has introduced a 
range of measures set out in the NAP (EPA, 2006). These measures vary from a 
Greener Homes Grant Scheme to integration of land-use planning and transport 
development.  However, these measures do not include any economic instruments 
similar to those outlined above for installations in the EU ETS sector.   
 
Individual emission sources are not constrained with respect to their emissions 
beyond the usual profit and loss calculus with respect to the price of energy.  Of 
course, that would change if Ireland introduced a carbon tax on the non-ETS sector.21 
 
One of the mechanisms that the government can use to meet emission targets in the 
non-ETS sector is to fund and develop CDMs that yield CDM credits or purchase 
these credits – CERs - in the secondary market.  The CERs will count towards 
meeting the emission limit in the non-ETS sector.   
 
 
 
 
 
20 Data source: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/citl_2005/citl_ireland.pdf 
21 See Tol et al (2008) for a discussion of the carbon tax. 
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Conclusion 
 
Market mechanisms are used extensively in the EU ETS sector to allocate and price 
CO2 allowances - EUAs.  Installations trade EUAs OTC and through exchanges, 
while a small but increasing number of Member States auction off up to 10% of their 
ETS emission limit. In contrast, in the non-ETS sector very little use is made of 
market mechanisms or alternative economic instruments such as a carbon tax.  That is 
about to change with the proposals for the non-ETS sector for 2013-2020. 
 
3.  The Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism 
 
The Clean Development Mechanism22 is a project based method of securing 
reductions in CO2 emissions.  The CDM is part of the Kyoto Protocol (“KP”).  As 
noted above each CDM project is given one or more CERs.  CERs can be sold and 
traded internationally between Annex 1 (i.e. developers/funders & purchasers) and 
non-Annex 1 (i.e. suppliers) countries.   
 
An example of a CDM project is a biogas plant for electricity generation that replaces 
the use of wood fuel for cooking and kerosene for lighting in a non-Annex 1 
country.23  The current arrangements cause high local air pollution and health 
problems, while the biogas plant would result in low air pollution and positive health 
benefits.  The CDM project also lowers carbon dioxide emissions compared to 
business as usual resulting in the issuing of CDM credits or CERs.   
 
Under the KP, Annex 1 countries are constrained in their total emissions; non-Annex 
1 countries are not constrained.  The close to 40 Annex 1 countries are those with 
high income per capita such as Ireland and other EU Member States (Lee, 2004, Table 
15, p. 74), the non-Annex 1 countries generally have low income per capita. 
 
If a non-Annex 1 country reduces its emissions through a CDM project, compared to 
business as usual,24 then the CERs can be credited to the meeting of the emissions 
target of an Annex 1 country.  The non-Annex 1 country gains investment and 
 
22 For a discussion of CDMs see Ellis et al (2007), Haites (2000); Lee (2004); and Michaelowa & Jotzo (2005). 
23 The example is based on Lee (2004, Table 3, p. 26). 
24 For example, the CDM project could be a biogas plant for electricity production that might replace wood fuel for cooking and 
kerosene for cooking.  For details see Lee (2004, p. 26). 
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sustainable projects increasing their welfare. The Annex 1 country is able to meet its 
emission targets at lower cost.  Thus both sides gain. 
 
CDMs are funded and developed by private firms, international organisations (e.g. the 
World Bank), public-private partnership funds and governments (e.g. Netherlands).  
In some instances the CDM projects are funded directly, in others by way of tender.   
 
There are also bilateral agreements between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries to 
develop CDMs. In other cases, private funds such as ICECAP are set up for the 
purpose of funding and developing CERs.25  Not surprisingly, a market has developed 
for intermediaries with expertise in developing CDM projects.  For example, ESB 
International advertises a Carbon Solution Business, which includes CDMs,26 while 
Agcert, part of the AES Corporation, located in Dublin, has created large aggregations 
of CERs from the agriculture sector.27  
 
Administration 
 
The administration of CDMs is through the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change Executive Board (“EB”), which consists of 10 members, 
including one from each of the five official UN regions and two each from Annex 1 
and non-Annex 1 countries.  The administration is responsible for establishing 
processes and procedures validating and verifying a CDM project, issuing a CER and 
monitoring the emissions reduction of a CDM project (Lee, 2004).  This has led to 
substantial transaction costs in getting CDM projects approved (Michaelowa & Jotzo, 
2005), which critics argue have not declined as might be expected as familiarity with 
the system increased (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2008, p. 4). 
 
A CDM project participant needs to be approved by an Annex 1 country, while the 
project itself needs to be approved by the non-Annex 1 country which then refers the 
application to the Executive Board.  It is the Executive Board that accredits 
independent organisations that will validate CDM projects.   
 
 
25 For details see Lee (2004, p. 77-79). 
26 For details see www.esbi.ie/activities/esbi_cs.html. (Accessed on 10 February 2009) 
27 For details see http://www.agcert.com/aboutus.aspx. (Accessed on 1 April 2009). 
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In the EU any Member State can approve a CDM project participant.  However, in 
practice it appears that the UK and the Netherlands are responsible for approving 
most CDM project participants.  The popularity of these jurisdictions probably 
reflects the absence of administrative fees.  In contrast, Ireland charges for approval 
of CDM projects and hence accounts for few projects. 28   Indeed, it appears that as of 
31 March 2009 Ireland had issued only one letter of approval for a CDM project and 
none had been approved by the EB. 29  
Underpinning the CDM Market: Registries 
 
The CDM market is underpinned by the International Transaction Log (“ITL”) and a 
CDM registry as well as national registries of countries that have ratified the KP that 
play analogous roles to their counterparts in the EU set out above.30  The ITL 
validates transactions proposed by registries.  It builds up records of holdings and 
transactions and provides certainty of delivery of carbon to the market.   
 
The CDM registry issues CERs generated by CDM projects, distributes CERs to 
CDM project participants and forwards CERs to national registers.  The ITL was 
developed later than the CITL reflecting the fact that the CITL operated during the 
pilot phase of EU ETS, while the ITL only came into effect with the coming into 
effect of the KP in 2008. 
 
In 2008 the EU’s CITL and Member States registries were linked to the ITL.31  The 
link means that CERs can be transferred to the registries of Member States.  In other 
words, a company can transfer CERs into their accounts in Member State registries.  
With the CITL and the ITL linked, each Member State registry will be connected to 
the ITL only and each transaction involving a Member State will be passed on to the 
CITL only for recording and additional checks. 
CDM Market 
 
The CDM market can be divided into primary and secondary. The primary market 
refers to the funding and development of CDM projects, together with the associated 
 
28 The EPA website contains a form entitled, “CDM – Approval Application Form”.  For details see: 
http://www.epa.ie/downloads/forms/etu/irl%20cdm%20032-11.xls 
29 It should be noted that the letter of approval only approves the participant as an investor in the CDM project and does not carry 
any approval concerning the project itself.  Based on information provided by the EPA. 
30 This discussion follows Howard (2005). 
31 This discussion is based on CEC (2008b). 
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CERs. The secondary market refers to the trading of CERs, whereby the original 
owner of the CDM project trade the emission reductions to another party. Overtime 
the relative importance of the secondary market has increased: in 2005 it accounted 
for only 8% of the CDM market by value; in 2007 the secondary market accounted 
for 42% by value of the CDM market.32  
 
In terms of buyers of primary CDMs, the EU as a whole accounted for 87% in 2007 
of volumes purchased, compared to 81% in 2006.33  Within the EU the leading buyer 
is the UK, accounting for 59% of all CDMs in 2007, up from 54% in 2006.  Other EU 
countries that were important purchasers included Europe-Baltic Sea (12%), and Italy 
and Spain at 4% each.  Outside the EU the leading buyer was Japan at 11% in 2007 
up from 6% in 2006. 
 
China is by far the leading supplier of CDM projects.  In 2007 it accounted for 73% of 
volumes supplied, up from 54% in 2006.  Brazil and India each accounted for 6% in 
2007, a drop in market share compared to 2006.  It seems as though China will 
maintain its leading position, given the large number of projects it has in the pipeline 
(Capoor & Ambrosi, 2008, pp. 28-29).  
 
The supply of CDM projects has expanded rapidly in recent years.  In 2004 there was 
less than 100 m tCO2e; by 2007 this had increased to approximately 550 m tCO2e.34 
 
The prices of CERs are published on a daily basis.35  However, according to Lee 
(2004, p.65) CER prices vary according to “risks, technology type and social 
development components.”  In view of the fact that the overwhelming proportion of 
funders and developers of CDM projects are from the EU it is not surprising that the 
EU ETS price influences the CER price.  However, it appears that in more recent 
times the two markets may have become decoupled (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2008).  
CERs usually trade at a discount to EUAs.  
 
 
32 For details see Capoor & Ambrosi (2007, Table 1, p. 3; 2008, Table 1, p.1).  
33 For details see Capoor & Ambrosi (2008, Figure 4, p. 25).  The data refer to primary CDMs as shares of volumes purchased, 
vintages up to 2012.  The data also includes JIs, but since these are quite unimportant the distribution will largely reflect CDMs.  
It should be noted that the CDMs of funds are allocated to the countries in proportion to the countries that hold shares in the fund. 
34 Capoor & Ambrosi (2008, Figure 1, p. 20).  The volumes refer to project based emission reductions transactions for vintages 
up to 2012. 
35http://www.eex.com/en/Market%20Data/Trading%20Data/Emission%20Rights/Emission%20Futures%20%7C%20Derivatives/
futures-table/2008-09-29#EUA 
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4. Interaction of EU Emissions Policy and CDMs: 2008-2012 
 
In this section we consider the role of CERs in the EU ETS and the non-ETS sectors.  
It should be noted that the CDMs are what is referred to under the KP as a ‘flexible 
mechanism’.  Flexible mechanisms under KP also refer to Joint Implementation 
projects (“JI”) which are similar to CDMs but intra-Annex 1 countries, where the 
credits earned are referred to as Emission Reduction Units (“ERU”).  In any event JIs 
are considerably less developed than CDMs.  According to the NTMA (2008, p.12) 
the 1,000th CDM project was approved in April 2008, but there are only two JI 
projects registered and no ERUs issued.  
 
CDMs & the EU ETS Sector 
 
In Ireland, initially, an upper limit of 50% of each installation’s emission’s target 
could be met though flexible mechanisms under KP (EPA, 2006. p. 27).    
Subsequently the limit for the period 2008-2012 was set at 11% of the allocation to 
each installation in the power generation and in the cement sectors, and 5% in the 
general sector (EPA, 2008, p.5).  This reduction was one of the conditions imposed on 
Ireland before the EU would accept its NAP (EPA, 2008, p.3). 
 
The right to fund and develop CDMs and purchase CERs in the secondary market up 
to these limits have been assigned to the owners of the various installations free of 
charge.  This is consistent with the overall policy stance of Ireland of distributing 
allowances free of charge to existing sources of pollution.  Change would require both 
legislation and approval by the Commission. 
 
Once a CDM project is approved and the CERs certified, the funder can use the CERs 
as part of the allowances it surrenders to match its emissions.  Alternatively the CERs 
can be purchased in the secondary market.  It appears that the owners of the 
installations in Ireland are active on the secondary market for CERs.  These firms may 
also be funding and developing CDM projects, but routing the applications through 
the UK and/or the Netherlands rather than Ireland.   
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CDMs and the Non-ETS Sector 
 
In the non-traded sector, the State is responsible for the reduction of CO2 emissions 
through a whole series of actions noted above, including CERs. 
 
The State has decided to purchase a maximum of 18.035 million allowances (i.e. 
emission credits) on the international market36 to ensure that Ireland has sufficient 
allowances to comply with the KP commitments in the non-traded sector.  The 
indicative totals suggest that Ireland will 8% of its non-ETS allowances over the 
period 2008 to 2012 through purchase of CDM credits.37  These are self-imposed 
limits.  However, the adoption of additional policies to reduce emissions in the non-
ETS sector has meant that the maximum may not be required (EPA, 2008, p. 9).  Of 
course, the shortfall is likely to be reinforced by the subsequent recession.   
 
The government created a Carbon Fund under the Carbon Fund Act 2007 which is 
administered by the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA).  According to 
the 2007 Annual Report of the Carbon Fund, investments have been made in three 
funds: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”) Multilateral 
Carbon Credit Fund; the World Bank Carbon Fund for Europe; and the World Bank 
BioCarbon Fund (NTMA, 2008, p. 14).  
 
In terms of expenditure the National Development Plan 2007-2013 approved €270 
million for purchase of carbon credits.  There was a prior commitment of €20 million 
by the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government in these funds 
(NTMA, 2008, p. 29). 
 
5. CDMWs: Rationale and Key Issues  
 
The Problem 
 
The EU is anxious that the CDM should continue as a method for emission reduction.  
Since CDM projects require a lead time for planning and yield benefits – measured in 
CERs – over a period of years, it is important for CDM suppliers to have certainty 
over future demand.  At the present time the KP, which governs the creation of these 
 
36 This refers to both CDMs and JIs. 
37 In terms of overall allowances this is equivalent to 6%.  For details see EPA (2006, p. 5,927). 
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rights, is to expire in 2012.  A meeting scheduled at the end of 2009 in Copenhagen 
will discuss a successor to the KP.  The difficulty of reaching an agreement as well as 
its uncertainty about its contents is likely to adversely effect the development of 
CDMs that yield CERs post-2012.  By taking timely action well ahead of December 
2009, the EU hopes to provide a lead for the Copenhagen conference and increase 
certainty concerning future demand for CDM credits post 2012. 
 
The Solution 
 
At the present time – 2008-2012 – in the non-ETS sector a Member State can meet a 
certain portion of their emission target through CDMs.  The CERs from that accrue 
from these CDMs can only be used to satisfy meeting the limit set for emission levels 
in the non-ETS sector in a particular Member State.  That is about to change. 
 
Under the EU proposals for 2013-2020, a Member State can transfer up to 3% of any 
unused CDMs to another Member State (i.e. CDMWs as defined in the 
Introduction).38  The European Parliament’s wording in this respect might be usefully 
quoted:39 
 
(16)  The continued ability for Member States to use CDM credits is 
important to help ensure a market for those credits after 2012. To help 
ensure such market as well as to ensure further greenhouse gas emission 
reductions within the Community and thus enhance the implementation of 
the objectives of the Community relating to renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, energy security, innovation and competitiveness, it is proposed to 
allow the annual use by Member States of credits from greenhouse gas 
emission reduction projects in third countries up to a quantity representing 
3% of the greenhouse gas emissions of each Member State not covered 
under Directive 2003/87/EC in the year 2005 or in other Member States , 
until a future international agreement on climate change has been reached. 
Member States should be allowed to transfer the unused part of that quantity 
to other Member States (emphasis in original). 
 
 
 
 
 
38 As noted in footnote 3 above, CDM credits may be used to meet more than 3% of a Member States non-ETS emission target.  
However, for reasons set out in that footnote these are not considered in this paper. 
39 European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 December 2008 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community's greenhouse 
gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020 (COM(2008)0017 – C6-0041/2008 – 2008/0014(COD)).  This may be accessed 
at:http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-
0611+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN#BKMD-18    
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Four observations can be made about the proposal: 
 
• Since the EU is the major buyer of CDM credits, its commitment to continue 
to purchase CERs to 2020 will be an important signal on which participants 
can rely to further develop the market.  The evidence cited above demonstrates 
that the supply of CDMs has been rapid, as judged by the growth in CDMs 
and the volume in the pipeline. 
 
• The CDM is to continue to assist the EU in meeting its energy efficiency 
goals, but the share of EU non-ETS emissions that can be accounted for by 
CDM credits appears to be lower than at present.  In the case of Ireland, for 
example, under the 2008-2012 NAP 8% of the non-ETS emission limit can be 
met through CDM credits, compared to between 3-5% in 2013-2020. 
 
• The creation of a new property right, the CDMW, that can be traded between 
Member States.  These property rights are owned, initially at least, by the 
Member State.  There are well developed markets for warrants and options for 
other assets such as shares and commodities and hence there is no reason – 
providing the right structures are put in place – why a CDMW market should 
not develop as well.40   
 
• The CDMW property right will acquire a value.  Supply is reduced while 
demand is likely to increase.  The share of CDM credits that can count 
towards meeting the non-ETS emission limits is halved, while the demand for 
CERs is increased because the non-ETS emission limits have been reduced.  
In Ireland’s case greenhouse gas limits for 2020 are set at 20% below those of 
2005 (CEC, 2008a, Annex, p. 15). 
 
Conclusion 
 
It should be noted that both the continuation of the status quo and the creation of the 
CDMW property address the problem as identified above.  However, the choice of the 
CDMW over the status quo reflects the fact CDMWs offer a more cost effective way of 
reducing emissions.  This will be discussed further in section 6 below. 
 
6.  Two Principles to Guide CDMW Policy 
 
In deciding policy towards the CDMW it is proposed that two principles should be 
employed.  The first concerns the correct pricing of CDMWs is used when the 
Member State decides how to meet its non-ETS emission limits for 2013-2020, the 
second, given that the CDMWs will acquire a value, how the Member State should 
allocate those rights.   
 
40 This is discussed further below in section 7 below. 
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Principle One: Meeting Non-ETS Emission Limits Cost Effectively  
 
The first principle is that the emission limits set for a Member State should be 
achieved at minimum cost.  This principle is clearly consistent with the general tenor 
of EU emission and climate change policy.  This means that, at the margin, the 
abatement cost per tCO2 should be the same for all non-ETS emission sources.  If this 
is not the case then it is possible to increase abatement efforts where the marginal 
abatement costs are low and reduce these efforts where the costs are high and overall 
costs will decline.   
 
In undertaking this exercise it is important that CDMWs are correctly priced.  The 
appropriate price or abatement cost of using a CER is the price of the CDMW plus the 
price of the CER in either the primary or secondary market.  It is not just the price of 
the CER.   
 
An example will illustrate the merits of this approach.  Suppose the marginal cost of 
abatement in Member State A in the non-ETS sector is €50.00, while in Member State 
B it is €30.  If both Member States price the CDMW at zero and consider only the 
CER price of €20, then both Member States will use their full allocation of CDMW 
towards meeting their non-ETS target - scenario 1 in Table 1.  In such a case the CER 
price is less than the cost of abatement and so the Member State will have no 
incentive to sell the CDMWs.  No CDMWs will be traded between Member States. 
 
However, suppose that the two Member States were to consider the opportunity cost 
of the CDMWs – scenario 2 in Table 1.   In other words, CDMWs have positive value, 
which for illustrative purposes is €15.  Member State B would sell its CDMWs to 
Member State A. This reflects the fact that for Member State A less resources are 
used in abatement - €30 – compared with the cost of the CDMW+CER at €35.  The 
Member State will be better off by €5.00.  In contrast, Member State A will purchase 
a CDMW for €15 since the price of the CDMW+CER is less than the marginal cost of 
abatement at €50.  Member State B will be better off by €15.  More emission 
reduction will take place in the Member State where the cost is less (i.e. B), rather 
than the Member State where the cost is higher (i.e. A). 
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Table 1  
Alternative Treatment of CDMWs: Two Scenarios 
 
Member 
State 
Marginal Cost 
of Abatement 
CER Price CDMW Price Trades 
 Scenario 1: CDMW price treated as though zero 
A €50 €20 Treated as zero None 
 B €30 €20 Treated as zero None 
Scenario 2¨CDMW price treated as non-zero – the market price 
A €50 €20 €15 A will buy CDMW 
 B €30 €20 €15 B will sell CDMW 
Source: See text. 
 
In the above example it is assumed that the limits set for CDMs will be binding, thus 
giving rise to a positive value for CDMWs.  However, the limits may not be binding 
and then the price of a CDMW would be zero.  This is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Illustration of Price of Reducing CO2 emissions in European Union Using the Clean 
Development Mechanism 
P1
P0
QD Q1 QL
Price of
reductions
Quantity of reductions
EU MAC
CDM cost
Warrant price
 
MAC = marginal abatement cost. 
Source: See text. 
 
Assume that the price of a CDM credit or CER is set on the world market, with 
constant marginal cost (P0).41  The Y axis shows the marginal abatement cost curve 
(“MAC”) for meeting the EU’s aggregate reduction limit, while the X axis shows the 
limit, (QL), in tonnes of CO2.  If there is no limit on the use of CDM credits, or the 3% 
 
41 Ignore P1 and Q1 for the moment.  
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limit is non-binding, Member States will buy QL-QD CDM credits.  CDMWs will 
command a zero price, since Member State’s will not have exhausted their 3% CDM 
credit allocation.  The prevailing price of CERs in the EU will be close to the world 
price of CERs (P0).  The marginal cost of compliance will follow the EU marginal 
abatement curve until (QD, P0) beyond which it will remain constant at the world 
CDM price.  Total cost of compliance for the EU will be the area under this curve. 
 
The more interesting case is where the EU faces a binding target on its aggregate use 
of CDMs.  Assume that only QL-Q1 CDMs may be used – this is equivalent to the 3% 
allocation.  If all EU Member States use their CDM rights in an economically 
efficient way, buyers would be prepared to pay P1 for a CDM credit or CER.  If the 
CDMW market is competitive and there are no transaction costs, CDMWs will trade at 
P1-P0.  If the market is less than perfectly competitive or there are transaction costs, 
CDMW prices will be lower than P1-P0.  The Member State that is a net purchaser of 
CDMs will pay P1- P0 for a CDMW to a Member State(s) that is a net seller, and then 
purchase a CER on the world market at price P0.  Member States with relatively low 
marginal abatement costs will be able to sell CDMWs and thus capture the rent created 
by the constraint.   
 
Now consider a Member State that has high marginal abatement costs relative to the 
rest of the EU. (For details see Figure 2 below).  This Member State will use domestic 
abatement up to QD, develop or purchase Q1-QD CDM credits using the 3% allocation 
to Member States and purchase QL-Q1 CDMWs from another Member State(s).  If 
total EU use of CDM credits does not face a binding constraint, as with Figure 1, 
CDMWs are priced at zero.  However, if the 3% EU constraint is binding, the Member 
State will pay P1- P0 for CDMWs (where P1 is the same as P1 in Figure 1 above), plus 
P0 for the CDM credit.  Moreover, the domestically-developed/purchased CDM 
credits should also be valued in a similar manner, since the CDMW is the opportunity 
cost for the Member State using its 3% allocation to meet its domestic target.   
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Figure 2  
Illustration of Price of Reducing CO2 Emissions in a high MAC Member State Using the 
Clean Development Mechanism 
 
P1
P0
QD Q1 QL
National MAC
CDM cost
Price of
reductions
Quantity of reductions
 
MAC = marginal abatement cost. 
Source: See text. 
 
Principle Two: Maximizing the Value of the Tradable Rights to CDMs for the 
Member State 
 
The second general principle is that the value of the CDMWs should be maximised 
and accrue to the Member State.  These are valuable rights and it is not at all clear that 
they should be distributed free to, for example, the ESB to develop through its carbon 
solution arm.  The allocation of EUA rights under the EU ETS 2008-2012 on a free of 
charge basis has been severely criticised in that it leads to inefficiency and distortions 
(e.g. Matthes & Neuhoff, 2007).   
 
Conclusion 
 
The two general principles are mutually reinforcing. The more that a Member State 
treats the CDMWs as a valuable property right, the more likely it is that they will be 
valued correctly in the decision as to how many should be used to meet the Member 
State’s non-ETS emission limit and how much should be traded.  Furthermore, if the 
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CDMWs are valued in a transparent and open way, then it is much more difficult for a 
Member State to assign them free of charge to another entity to develop or sell. 
 
7. Policy Options for Trading Warrants in CDMs – CDMWs 
 
Attention is now turned to three alternative treatments of the CDMWs the degree to 
which they are consistent with the two general principles. 
 
Separate the Abatement Decision from the Rights Decision   
 
Analytically and conceptually the cleanest and simplest option for the Member State 
is to separate the decision as to the determination of the volume of CERs to be used in 
meeting its non-ETS emission limit from the decision as to how to best maximise the 
value of the CDMW rights.  The two decisions are not, of course, completely divorced 
since in determining the volume of CDM credits to be used in meeting the non-ETS 
emission limit, a price for the CDMW needs to be taken into account.  But how would 
it work? 
 
The Member State would – as with the current NAP – design a plan to meet the 
emission limit for the non-ETS sector.  The NAP would carefully evaluate the 
abatement costs from the various domestic emission sources such as transport, waste, 
agriculture and so on.  Estimates would then be made of the marginal abatement costs 
of the various polices to reduce emissions to the level required by the EU limits.   
 
Next consideration of the use of CDM credits would be taken into account.  The price 
of CERs and CDMWs would provide a benchmark against which to make the decision 
as to whether or not to purchase or sell CDMWs.  Here the Member State – as in the 
above example – compares its abatement costs with the cost of the CER+CDMW.   If 
the abatement costs are greater than the CER+CDMW price then the Member State 
will buy CDMWs as well as CERs and not undertake additional domestic CO2 
abatement; if less than then the Member State will sell its CDMWs and undertake 
extra domestic abatement.  At the same time the Member State would instruct an 
agency, such as the NTMA in the case of Ireland, to maximise the return from its 
CDMWs.  
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Two Problems 
 
There are least two potential problems with such a solution.  First, it presupposes that 
a CDMW market will develop.  A possible difficult occurs when the final user of the 
CDMWs are Member States, since the CERs purchased by the CDMWs are used to 
meet their non-ETS emission targets.  Second, the solution assumes that there will be 
zero transaction costs.   
 
What Market Mechanism? 
 
It seems reasonable to assume that an OTC and perhaps exchange market would 
develop for CDMWs that parallels the existing CER market described above, while the 
existing system of national registries could be used to certify transfers of ownership.   
The same brokers and dealers who are concerned with CERs could easily develop an 
expertise in trading CDMWs.  Indeed it would build upon their knowledge and skills.   
Furthermore, as with EUAs and CERs, no restrictions should be placed on ownership 
of CDMWs since market traders may have different expectations to Member States 
and thus should be permitted to operate in the market should they so wish.  
Furthermore these market intermediaries are likely to develop products such as a 
futures market and various other hedges that may be of value to Member States.  
Hence even though the Member State will, in the final analysis, be the user of the 
CDMWs42 market intermediaries can perform valuable roles of assistance to Member 
States.  
 
In a related paper, Gorecki et al (2009) consider the appropriate market mechanism 
for a different property right that will be created under the EU climate change policy 
for 2013-2020.  This is the right of a Member State to transfer to another Member 
State part of their allowed emission allocation in the non-ETS sector, which is 
referred to as Transfer Emission Units or TEUs.  Three different mechanisms were 
considered: market intermediaries (i.e. OTC or an exchange trades); auctions; and, 
bilateral arrangements.  The answer as to which is the best mechanism, using a variety 
of criteria, depends critically on the size of the market.  If the market is likely to be 
small then market intermediaries are ranked first, while if the market size is large then 
auctions are the preferred mechanism.  Since the TEU market was considered large an 
 
42 It is of course possible that environmental groups such as Greenpeace may buy CDMWs and cancel them as a way of making 
emissions targets stricter. 
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auction was recommended as the best mechanism.  In view of possible competitive 
problems because a small number of sellers were likely to account for a large 
percentage of TEUs sold, an auction at the EU level was preferred, rather than a series 
of auctions at the level of the Member State. 
 
In case of CDMWs the market size, at the Member State level, is likely to considerably 
smaller than TEUs.  While a limit for the latter has not been set, Gorecki et al (2009) 
used a working assumption of 10% of the non-ETS emission limit, which is 
equivalent to 5.7% of all emissions, substantially above the 3% limit set for CDMWs, 
which is equivalent to 1.7% of all emissions.43  This suggests that market size in 
CDMWs is likely to be towards the smaller end of the spectrum thus favouring market 
intermediaries rather than auctions.  Existing players, including Member States, are 
familiar with the OTC and exchange methods of trading a closely related property 
right, CDM credits or CERs, while the exercise carried out above with respect to 
TEUs would also suggest that market intermediaries are the preferred mechanism.   
 
Section 5 above argued that the European Parliament’s wording with respect to the 
upper limit of CDMWs is 3% of the non-ETS emission limit,44 which is equivalent to 
1.7% of all emissions.  However, an alternative interpretation is that the 3% refers to 
all emissions limit – ETS and non-ETS.  If this is accepted as the correct 
interpretation, then it would appear that the CDMW market would be characterised as 
large rather than small, in which case an auction is the most appropriate market 
mechanism.  
 
Irrespective of the market mechanism the results of Tol (2009) raise the possibility of 
competitive concerns in the trading of CDMWs, particularly on the demand side where 
Denmark is estimated to account for 58% of all CDMWs purchases, followed by 
Luxembourg (21%) and Sweden (11%).45 Hence there is a need to carefully monitor 
trading in CDMWs to ensure that there is no breach of EU competition law.  This task 
could be undertaken by the DG Competition, perhaps in partnership with the relevant 
national competition agencies.  Indeed, an EU-wide auction instead of a series of 
Member State auction would be preferred to minimise competition problems.     
 
43 All emissions refers to ETS and non-ETS.  The importance of ETS and non-ETS refers to 2020 and is taken from Capros et al 
(2008, Table 4, p. 4). 
44 See also CEC (2008a, p. 12). 
45 On the supply side the market is only moderately concentrated with Poland supplying a third of the market and three other 
Member States accounting for more than 10% (the Czech Republic, Greece and Romania).  
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Transaction Costs 
 
While conceptually elegant the above solution could see the NTMA, or its equivalent 
in another Member State, simultaneously buying and selling CDMWs.  If transaction 
costs were zero then this would not matter, but this is unlikely to be the case.  If 
CDMWs are sold through a broker or exchange there is likely to be a commission 
charge related to the value of the transaction.  Hence the proposed system needs to be 
modified. 
 
A Resolution 
 
It should be recalled that the purpose of separating the decision on how to meet the 
non-ETS emission limit and maximizing the value of the CDMWs was in order to 
ensure that the opportunity cost or value of the these property rights should be taken 
into account properly by the Member State.  This therefore suggests that proxies need 
to be introduced for the CDMW price that can then be incorporated into the decisions 
of the Member State as to how to meet its non-ETS emission limits.  However, as the 
period 2013-2020 progresses and the CDMW market develops then more accurate 
prices can be included in the planning by the Member State.  Thus the Member State 
might have to consult on likely future prices for CDMWs.     
 
The Status Quo Continued 
 
An obvious alternative model is to continue the status quo which was outlined in 
section 4 above.  Under this option the State, through the NTMA, would purchase 
CDM credits in the primary and secondary market up to 3% the State’s non-ETS 
emission limit.  The State would then minimize the cost of meeting the non-ETS 
emission limit for the remaining 97%.   
 
The problem with this approach is that it violates both of the principles above.  No 
account is taken of the price of CDMW.  Indeed, it is for all practical purposes set at 
zero up to 3% of the non-ETS emission limit and infinity after that, since no 
consideration is given to purchasing CDMW in the market place from other Member 
States. 
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Retaining CDMWs as an Insurance Policy 
 
Another option would be for the Member State to use the 3% of the non-ETS 
emission limit that can be met through CDMs via CDMW as some form of insurance 
policy. It could be argued that there is considerable uncertainty about the ability to 
predict the level of emissions of the Member State to meet the limit set by the EU.  
Furthermore failure to meet the limit carries certain penalties which the Member State 
may not want to pay or incur.  Hence the Member State could allocate use its CDMW 
property right as an insurance policy.  If the rights are not needed then they can be 
sold through an agency such as the NTMA. 
 
The case for using the CDMWs as an insurance policy is weak at best.  First, all 
Member States have experience of complying with greenhouse gas emissions limits 
for the non-ETS sector.  In the case of Ireland this has not appear to have proved a 
problem for 2008-2012, although this will not become clear until the end of the 
period.  Second, during the 2013-2020 phase it is envisaged that Member States will 
meet the reduction of non-ETS on a linear basis with binding annual targets over the 
period, but with the opportunity to bank and borrow between years so that there is 
already a hedge or insurance built into the procedure (CEC, 2008c).  Third, there is a 
market for CDMWs which the Member State can use for insurance purposes.  At the 
present time there is already a future market for CERs and EUAs, so that one can be 
expected to develop for CDMWs as well.  Fourth, it is not clear that using the CDMW 
as an insurance policy is consistent with either of the two principles outlined above, 
since as with the previous option, no account of the value of the CDMW in the 
decision concerning the optimal mix of emissions from domestic and CDM sources. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While no option is perfect it is proposed that the first should be selected with the 
modifications as proposed.  In concrete form this would require the government to 
instruct the EPA to design a strategy or plan to meet the non-ETS emission limit 
while taking due regard to the value of the CDMWs.  The EPA could conduct a 
consultation process on how to value or price the CDMWs that could then be 
incorporated into the strategy.  To the extent that Ireland is a seller of these property 
rights the NTMA would be instructed to sell them to realise maximum value; to the 
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extent that Ireland is a purchaser then the NTMA would be instructed to purchase at 
minimum cost.  
 
8. Conclusion: Answering Three Questions 
 
The CDM mechanism forms an important instrument by which Ireland and other 
Member States meet their non-ETS emission targets.  In both the current (2008-2012) 
and next (2013-2020) phases of EU climate control a Member State can meet its non-
ETS emission target by developing CDMs and using the resulting CDM credits or 
purchasing CERs up to some maximum proportion.  However, there is a significant 
difference between the two phases:  under the current phase any unused allocation of 
CDM credits lapse if the Member State does not use them; under the next phase the 
Member State can exchange the right to use any unused CDM credits to another 
Member State.  As shown above the introduction of this right, the CDMW, should lead 
to achieving emission reduction targets at lower cost.   
   
Three questions were posed at the beginning of this paper.  The questions, together 
with the answers are as follows. 
 
First, how should the Member State treat the CDMW in making decisions concerning 
emission reduction in the non-ETS sector?     
 
To achieve the emission reductions in the non-ETS sector set for 2013 to 2020 
requires that the property right is priced appropriately by the Member State to ensure 
that compliance costs are minimised.  The CDMW rights should not therefore be 
treated as though they were a free good with a zero price.  The price of the property 
rights is important signal for Member States in deciding the level of domestic 
abatement compared to trading in CDMWs. 
 
Ideally the decision to meet the non-ETS emission target should be separate from the 
decision as to how the CDMW should be distributed.  However, the transaction costs 
of buying and selling CDMWs rule out this approach.   
 
The next best alternative is to design a strategy to meet the non-ETS emission limit 
having due regard to the value of the CDMWs.  In other words, some sort of shadow 
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price for CDMWs would be used in formulating the strategy in other to determine 
whether or not Ireland is a buyer or seller of CDMWs.  
 
To the extent that Ireland is a seller of CDMWs the NTMA would be instructed to sell 
them to realise maximum value; to the extent that Ireland is a purchaser then the 
NTMA would be instructed to purchase at minimum cost.  
 
Second, what mechanism should be used to facilitate the exchange of CDMWs? 
 
The preferred mechanism depends crucially on the market size.  There appears to be 
some ambiguity concerning whether or not the size of the CDMW market is 3% of the 
non-ETS emission limits or 3% of ETS plus non-ETS emission limits.  Drawing on 
earlier work by the authors, it is concluded that:  
 
• If the former case the preferred mechanism is market intermediaries such as 
OTC and exchanges.  CERs are currently traded on these markets and hence 
there a degree of familiarity with the underlying right that is being traded. 
   
• If the latter case then the preferred mechanism is an auction.  
 
 
However, irrespective of whether it is the former or the latter, in view of the presence 
of particularly large buyers, competition authorities will need to monitor the situation 
closely to ensure that no breach of competition law occurs.  Indeed, an EU-wide 
auction instead of a series of Member State auction would be preferred to minimise 
competition problems.     
 
Third, who should realise the value of CDMWs – the State, existing polluters etc?   
 
The value of CDMWs should accrue to the State.  There is no reason for these valuable 
rights to be given away ‘free’ to some third party.  In the case of the EU ETS the 
distribution of allowances on a free of charge basis has led to inefficiencies and 
distortions. 
 
 
18 May 2009 
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